Game Theory
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Latest episodes
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12 – Evolutionary Stability: Social Convention, Aggression, and Cycles
October 15, 2007 · 1 hr 6 minWe apply the idea of evolutionary stability to consider the evolution of social conventions. Then we consider games that involve aggressive (Hawk) and passive (Dove) strategies, finding that sometimes, evolutionary populations are mixed…
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11 – Evolutionary Stability: Cooperation, Mutation, and Equilibrium
October 10, 2007 · 1 hr 12 minWe discuss evolution and game theory, and introduce the concept of evolutionary stability. We ask what kinds of strategies are evolutionarily stable, and how this idea from biology relates to concepts from economics like domination and…
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10 – Mixed Strategies in Baseball, Dating and Paying Your Taxes
October 8, 2007 · 1 hr 14 minWe develop three different interpretations of mixed strategies in various contexts: sport, anti-terrorism strategy, dating, paying taxes and auditing taxpayers. One interpretation is that people literally randomize over their choices…
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9 – Mixed Strategies in Theory and Tennis
October 3, 2007 · 1 hr 13 minWe continue our discussion of mixed strategies. First we discuss the payoff to a mixed strategy, pointing out that it must be a weighed average of the payoffs to the pure strategies used in the mix. We note a consequence of this: if a…
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8 – Nash Equilibrium: Location, Segregation and Randomization
October 1, 2007 · 1 hr 14 minWe first complete our discussion of the candidate-voter model showing, in particular, that, in equilibrium, two candidates cannot be too far apart. Then we play and analyze Schelling’s location game. We discuss how segregation can occur in…
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7 – Nash Equilibrium: Shopping, Standing and Voting on a Line
September 26, 2007 · 1 hr 11 minWe first consider the alternative “Bertrand” model of imperfect competition between two firms in which the firms set prices rather than setting quantities. Then we consider a richer model in which firms still set prices but in which the…
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6 – Nash Equilibrium: Dating and Cournot
September 24, 2007 · 1 hr 12 minWe apply the notion of Nash Equilibrium, first, to some more coordination games; in particular, the Battle of the Sexes. Then we analyze the classic Cournot model of imperfect competition between firms. We consider the difficulties in…
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5 – Nash Equilibrium: Bad Fashion and Bank Runs
September 19, 2007 · 1 hr 9 minWe first define formally the new concept from last time: Nash equilibrium. Then we discuss why we might be interested in Nash equilibrium and how we might find Nash equilibrium in various games. As an example, we play a class investment…
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4 – Best Responses in Soccer and Business Partnerships
September 17, 2007 · 1 hr 12 minWe continue the idea (from last time) of playing a best response to what we believe others will do. More particularly, we develop the idea that you should not play a strategy that is not a best response for any belief about others’…
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3 – Iterative Deletion and the Median-Voter Theorem
September 12, 2007 · 1 hr 1 minWe apply the main idea from last time, iterative deletion of dominated strategies, to analyze an election where candidates can choose their policy positions. We then consider how good is this classic model as a description of the real…
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2 – Putting Yourselves into Other People’s Shoes
September 10, 2007 · 1 hr 9 minAt the start of the lecture, we introduce the “formal ingredients” of a game: the players, their strategies and their payoffs. Then we return to the main lessons from last time: not playing a dominated strategy; and putting ourselves into…
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1 – Introduction: Five First Lessons
September 5, 2007 · 1 hr 9 minWe introduce Game Theory by playing a game. We organize the game into players, their strategies, and their goals or payoffs; and we learn that we should decide what our goals are before we make choices. With some plausible payoffs, our…